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INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers health campaigns, and in particular mental health campaigns, 
from the perspective of social representations theory.  In particular, it focuses on some of the 
potentially problematic aspects of campaigns that focus on education.  It ends with a plea for 
more campaigns that draw on the theory from the outset, using Lauri’s (2005; 2015) use of 
the theory in a campaign to increase organ donation in Malta as an example of this.  
 
(MENTAL) HEALTH CAMPAIGNS – SOME BACKGROUND  
The main goal of many public health campaigns (of all kinds) is behaviour change in 
the individuals who might be exposed to them.  These campaigns have often been based on 
the classic (and largely individualistic) Knowledge-Attitudes-Behaviour-Practice paradigm 
(Joffe, 1996): here, the assumption is that an individual acts in accordance with their own 
ideas and attitudes, and that therefore giving people new or additional knowledge can lead to 
changes in attitudes, and subsequent behaviour change, which is then maintained over time.  
In many cases, the behaviours that health campaigns try to change are those that directly 
affect the same individual, even if there might also be beneficial public health consequences
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through this change.  Having safer sex, stopping smoking or eating more healthily are all of 
direct benefit to the health of an individual who is targeted by a health campaign, but these 
changes in behaviour will also benefit society more broadly through slowing or halting the 
spread of viruses or health-related problems, and may lead to decreased spending on 
healthcare, lower absenteeism at work and so on (Local Government Association, 2013).  
Some health campaigns aim to change behaviours that may not have specific benefits for 
those who are targeted and might subsequently change their attitudes and behaviours, but 
rather the behaviour change of that individual might benefit others quite directly: an 
individual with the flu who washes their hands after sneezing will not spread the virus to 
others; an individual who signs up to donate their organs in the event of their death will 
enable others to receive potentially life-saving organ donations.  Inevitably, a variety of 
techniques and tactics are used in any campaign; indeed, the rise of so-called ‘nudge’ 
techniques (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) may even now by-pass cognition altogether and aim 
to directly change behaviour in the desired direction through more implicit means, such as 
using smaller wine glasses to encourage customers to drink less alcohol (Pechey, Couturier, 
Hollands, Matzari, Munafò and Marteau, 2016).   
Mental health campaigns may involve encouraging behaviour change aimed at improving 
an individual’s own mental well-being, but there is usually an additional (or sometimes even 
primary) focus on encouraging attitudinal and behaviour change towards mental health 
problems and those with a diagnosis that aims to destigmatise mental ill health within society 
more broadly: this sets such campaigns apart slightly in terms of their aims from some others.  
Mental health campaigns are not new: the Mental Hygiene movement was active in several 
countries from the end of the Nineteenth century onwards (Barnes and Bowl, 2001), and 
organisations associated with it often transformed themselves into the mental health and 
education charities still active in today’s society (such as MIND in the UK); psychologists 
have also documented the design and delivery of specific campaigns for well over fifty years 
(see the famous Cumming and Cumming (1957) study in Blackfoot, Canada).  More recently, 
in England the Time To Change campaign has been running since 2009: originally intended 
as a three year campaign, it received an £18 million grant from the National Lottery fund and 
charity Comic Relief.  It initially involved twenty-eight local schemes to promote well-being 
and thirty-two anti-discrimination initiatives (Henderson and Thornicraft, 2009).  Its stated 
aims are as follows: 
“Improve public attitudes and behaviour towards people with mental health problems. 
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Reduce the amount of discrimination that people with mental health problems report in 
their personal relationships, their social lives and at work. 
Make sure even more people with mental health problems can take action to challenge 
stigma and discrimination in their communities, in workplaces, in schools and online. 
Create a sustainable campaign that will continue long into the future.” (http://www.time-
to-change.org.uk/about-us/what-is-time-to-change) 
Similarly, See Me Scotland, which has been running since 2001, states: “Our vision is to 
end mental health stigma and discrimination, enabling people who experience mental health 
problems to live fulfilled lives.” (https://www.seemescotland.org/about-see-me/). Such 
campaigns are varied, and employ numerous different strategies in an attempt to change 
attitudes.  Time To Change provides an excellent example of this variety: it has a significant 
social media presence, and has mounted large scale sub-campaigns on issues such as mental 
health in the workplace and supporting a friend with a mental health problem, with television 
adverts, interviews with a range of individuals including celebrities, and downloadable 
resources.  It has also used cinema and Youtube film clips aimed at challenging expectations; 
additionally, it has organised a roadshow around different locations, and has worked on 
similar projects in schools (see http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/ for archive and current 
material). The three different strategies for changing attributions for mental illness 
summarised by Corrigan et al. (2001) are very clear here in different ways: education, contact 
and protest.   
There is considerable debate as to whether these mental health campaigns have any effect 
on public attitudes and behaviour (Mehta, Clement, Marcus, Stona, Bezborodovs, Evans-
Lacko, Palacios, Docherty, Barley, Rose, Koschorke, Shidaye, Henderson and Thornicraft, 
2015). Some evaluations do find evidence of some change: Henderson et al. (2016) provide a 
recent review of various campaigns including Time to Change which maintains that in many 
cases public attitudes to mental health problems have become more accepting, and the public 
show a decreased desire for social distance with people with a diagnosis.  However, the 
overall picture is mixed, as Smith (2013) and Nettle (2013) point out: reported changes in 
attitudes are often small, not always sustained, or, in some cases, completely lacking. In 
particular, there is a lack of consensus around the efficacy of campaigns that are based on 
education (Mehta et al, 2015), which will now be discussed in more detail.   
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MENTAL HEALTH LITERACY AND EDUCATION IN MENTAL HEALTH 
CAMPAIGNS  
Education as a strategy is often framed as (although certainly not interchangeable 
with) mental health literacy. As Corrigan et al. (2001) state: “the key component to education 
programmes is replacing myths about mental illness with correct information,” (p. 189).  This 
is also the focus of mental health literacy programmes.  There has been a growing interest in 
the concept of mental health literacy over the past decade, as a review of the number of 
articles published on the topic in any academic search engine shows. Many mental health 
education campaigns around the world employ the concept of mental health literacy, either by 
seeking to add to or to replace existing understandings amongst the general public (Corrigan 
and Shapiro, 2010). The concept of health literacy has the broader support of the World 
Health Organisation (see, for example, Kickbusch, Pelikan, Apfel and Tsouros, 2013).  Wei, 
McGrath, Hayden and Kutcher (2015) have recently argued that mental health literacy can be 
regarded as having four components: 
1.  Knowledge about how to obtain and maintain good mental health. 
2. Understanding about mental disorders and their treatments. 
3.  Knowledge which decreases stigma. 
4.  Knowledge which enhances help-seeking efficacy.   
They maintain that these four components are also consistent with WHO guidelines.  
The parallels between these components and the aims of the Time To Change campaign 
mentioned above are clear. Assessment and evaluation of mental health campaigns has been 
an integral feature since Cumming and Cumming’s (1957) study, and, indeed, continued 
funding is often dependent upon it.  In fact, it has been suggested that education alone does 
not lead to the most significant change in attitudes in adults (Corrigan, Morris, Michaels, 
Rafaaz and Rüsch, 2012), but this generally remains an aspect of most campaigns regardless, 
and understanding is measured both before and after many campaigns as part of most 
evaluations (Corrigan and Shapiro, 2010).  Changes to knowledge can be assessed in several 
ways: the Mental Health Knowledge Schedule (Evans-Lacko et al, 2010) is a good example 
of an attempt to establish a psychometric scale to examine change over time in such 
understandings.  It combines a few brief items (such as ‘Medication can be an effective 
treatment for people with mental health problems’) with vignettes identified by professionals 
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as illustrations of depression, stress, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, drug addiction and grief; 
participants are asked how far they see these descriptions as symptomatic of mental health 
problems.  Greater symmetry on the part of the public with professional understanding is seen 
as greater mental health knowledge, and the success of a campaign is often defined as when 
change in the direction of professional understanding is discernible (Corrigan and Shapiro, 
2010).   
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY: CHALLENGING AND CHANGING 
UNDERSTANDINGS  
Such attempts to change understandings in a particular direction (to something which, 
in Corrigan et al’s [2001] words is more ‘correct’ [p.189]) might raise some concerns from 
the perspective of social representations theory (and indeed from some other perspectives 
too). Social representations theory is a deliberate attempt to develop a social psychological 
theory of common sense understanding (Moscovici, 1984).  In several places, Moscovici 
(Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici and Marková, 1998) makes clear his desire to rehabilitate 
common sense thinking, reclaiming the concept from the ways in which it has been 
denigrated and dismissed over time.  In his conceptualisation, and indeed in the work of 
others who have developed these ideas, we see the psychology of a thinking society (Duveen, 
2000; Moscovici, 1984) and of the “cognitive prodigal” (Moscovici, 1990, p176) and not of 
the individualised cognitive miser (Nisbett and Ross, 1980) always keen to take the short-cut 
in their judgements and thinking.  We see a social psychology that challenges notions of a 
hierarchy of knowledge, with scientific understanding superior to common sense 
(Jovchelovitch, 2008) and instead takes seriously the differing contexts of the two modes of 
thinking instead of comparing one with the other (Foster, 2003).  The social, historical, 
political and cultural context of the production and maintenance of knowledge and of 
communication is paramount. 
There is, then, a potential tension when we consider attempts to change understanding 
from this perspective (Howarth, Foster and Dorrer, 2004).  Suggesting that change in 
understanding is necessary involves making a judgement that existing knowledge is 
problematic in some way.  However, not to acknowledge that people can, and do, hold 
understandings that can be harmful either to themselves or others would also be naïve, and 
hugely problematic. There are numerous examples of this stemming from classic social 
psychology (e.g. Clark and Clark, 1947) onwards:  Howarth (2007) shows the harmful effects 
on children of becoming aware of racist beliefs that others hold about them, and the way that 
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these can become internalised; Rubinstein and Foster (2013) demonstrate how negative 
representations of older women and their role in society affects women as they go through 
menopause.  Accepting existing understanding as the status quo also fails to enable the 
actualisation of the more transformative aspects of social representations theory (Campbell 
and Jovchelovitch, 2000), as evidenced in numerous studies (Jovchelovitch and Priego-
Hernandez, 2013; Krause, 2003; Lauri and Lauri, 2005).  
Part of the problem in this case is the character of understandings about mental health 
problems.  There is reasonable consensus that the widely reported negative attitudes towards 
mental health problems amongst the public (Angermeyer and Dietrich, 2005), seemingly so 
historically tenacious (Jodelet, 1991), are problematic in that they encourage discrimination 
against those labelled mentally ill and discourage individuals from seeking help when they 
find themselves in distress (Rüsch, Angermeyer and Corrigan, 2005). There is perhaps less 
consensus about what these attitudes and understandings might be changed to.   
In light of the above definition and discussion of mental health literacy, it is 
instructive to consider the perspective of mental health campaigns more specifically on this 
issue in more depth. Many campaigns start from one of these two premises:    
1.  The general public lack any understanding about mental health problems, or they hold 
understandings that are incomplete.  Mental health campaigns must therefore seek to ‘fill the 
gaps’, providing individuals with understanding that they would otherwise lack. 
2.  The general public hold well-developed understandings about mental health problems that 
are incorrect.  Mental health campaigns must therefore seek to correct these faulty 
understandings.  
These starting points are usually similar for other health campaigns: professionals and 
others who are interested in increasing immunisation rates in young children might take as 
their starting point either the possibility that parents lack awareness or understanding of how 
vaccinations work, or that they might hold incorrect understandings, such as linking the 
MMR vaccination to an increased risk of developing autism (Provencher, 2007). To some 
extent, any approach along these lines rests upon the idea that scientific understanding is 
correct, and superior to any lay understandings that might be in circulation. Adopting a social 
representations theory perspective does not negate this, or suggest that ‘anything goes’ in 
relation to forms of knowledge. However, taking a social representations approach does call 
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for us to take into consideration the context and change in the production of any knowledge, 
whether in the consensual or the reified domain (Bangerter, 1995; Batel and Castro, 2009). 
Scientific understanding changes and develops just as common sense understanding does: 
smoking therapies were recommended as a treatment for asthma until the early part of the 21
st
 
century (Jackson, 2010) and the purported link between the MMR vaccine and autism was 
initially reported in the medical journal The Lancet in 1998, then partially refuted in 2004 and 
fully retracted by the same journal in 2010 (Godlee, Smith and Marcovitch, 2011).  
Mental health is a particularly contested area; indeed the very use of the terms ‘mental 
illness’, ‘mental health’ and ‘mental health problems’ are challenged by many theorists 
(Johnstone, 2000), concerned that they imply subscription to particular biomedical models 
that proves too restrictive in both conceptualisation and consequences.  While most other 
areas of health and illness claim a solid basis in science and research (see Wright and 
Treacher, 1982, for discussion of this), mental health has remained problematic: while it is 
beyond the scope of this short paper to review all of these, some notable issues should be 
addressed. Debates continue over shifting diagnoses and their categorisation in volumes such 
as the DSM (Insel, 2013), and the social and political influences on this process that 
challenge its claims to scientific objectivity (Kutchins and Kirk, 2001).  The success, and 
perhaps more importantly sometimes lack of success, in the development of pharmaceutical 
treatments for mental health problems have been well documented (Moncrieff 2007; 2013), 
as has the way that use of medication in mental health has been used to develop and sustain a 
disease-centred model of mental illness focused on a ‘chemical imbalance’ (ibid).  The search 
for genetic causes, lesions or abnormalities in the brain and so on continues, but numerous 
professionals have expressed concern that this has not borne fruit (Leff, 2001) and potentially 
overlooks other explanations (see, for example, the recent British Psychological Society 
document on understanding psychosis and schizophrenia which focuses on explanations 
rooted in trauma [Cooke, 2014]).  
This makes mental health campaigns that are based on giving information, and 
particularly on some of the foundation of mental health literacy, problematic.  Can we be 
certain that the information being given, either in an attempt to address absences in 
understanding or to change those in existence, is ‘correct’ and indeed beneficial? Some 
information clearly fits these criteria: there is good evidence to support the fact that people 
with a diagnosis of mental illness are not more likely to be violent than others (Taylor and 
Gunn, 1999), despite public understanding to the contrary (Phelan, Link, Stueve and 
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Pescosolido, 2000) and so conveying this information in education campaigns seems 
uncontroversial and important in that it is likely to decrease stigmatising approaches to 
people with a diagnosis
1
.  However, presenting information that suggests that mental health 
problems have a physical basis and can be treated ‘like any other illness’, however well-
intentioned, may be more problematic given the debates and discussion that continue on this 
subject, as discussed above.  
 
COMMON SENSE IN CONTEXT: SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS  
Some theorists have suggested that when it comes to mental illness, we see a failure 
of representation because the object can never be familiarised, as Moscovici (1984) argued 
was the case (Rose, 1996): instead, it remains strange and unfamiliarised. Others have 
suggested that we do not see a failure of the representational process itself, but that mental 
illness is familiarised as unfamiliar (Morant, 1996).  This would mean that individuals and 
social groups hold existing representations of mental ill health, even if these may not be 
particularly extensive or fully developed if mental health problems are not particularly salient 
in their own lives (Foster, 2011). These representations will not merely exist in the abstract, 
but will have an impact on the way that individuals within these social groups communicate, 
make decisions, interact with members of their own and other groups and so (Bauer and 
Gaskell, 1999; 2008). I would argue that this makes the first premise of certain mental health 
campaigns mentioned above - that the public lack information and are ‘ignorant’ of the facts 
about mental health - hard to support from a representational perspective.  Indeed, health 
educators assuming a lack of representation of an object has led to some high profile failures 
of other kinds of health campaigns, such as early HIV awareness campaigns in the UK 
(Stockdale, 1995).  
This then leaves the second premise - that people hold understandings but that these 
are incorrect and need to be altered.  From a representational point of view, these forms of 
understanding have developed for a purpose - that is, to allow orientation towards the object 
and communication about it (Moscovici, 1984); the relationship between identity and 
representation (Marková, 2007) is also critical here. Assuming that representations can (and 
                                                          
1
 Time To Change attempted just this in an innovative way with a mock film trailer ‘Schizo’, which was shown 
in cinemas.  Drawing on many techniques used in horror films (unsteady camera angles, freeze frames, 
discordant soundtrack etc) it subverts expectations by ultimately revealing a man making a cup of tea who tells 
us his name is Stuart, and he has a diagnosis of schizophrenia (see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kh2SpZP4Cg).  
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should) be changed without an understanding of the purpose that they serve within any given 
social group, and the context in which they have developed, is problematic: firstly, new forms 
of understanding may not be compatible with the particular social and cultural context; 
secondly, new forms of understanding do not necessarily replace other ways of understanding 
a concept, and thirdly, new or alternative forms of understanding may have unintended 
consequences that were not foreseen by the health educators.  I will discuss each of these in 
turn.  
An excellent example of the need to consider context in understandings of mental 
health is the Global Mental Health movement, which is “a coalition of individuals and 
institutions committed to collective actions that aim to close the treatment gap for people 
living with mental disorders worldwide” (Patel et al, 2011). As Campbell and Burgess (2012) 
point out, this translates into arguing for greater mental health provision around the world on 
the basis of the human rights of individuals who may or may not yet have a diagnosis but 
would qualify for one using “western understandings of health, healing and personhood” 
(p.379). On the issues of understanding there are echoes here with aspects of the mental 
health literacy movement.  The assumption is that there are certain universal facts about 
mental health problems that can be adopted by all, and that there are benefits associated with 
this process: people correctly recognise potential mental health problems in themselves and in 
those close to them, are not afraid to seek help from professionals, adhere to the (effective) 
treatments that they are given, support those they know with a diagnosis and lives are 
improved as a result. Yet again, it is hard to argue with the reasoning behind this, based as it 
is within human rights, and on a desire to decrease suffering. However, as Campbell and 
Burgess (2012) point out, tying the Global Mental Health movement so explicitly to 
biomedicine risks writing out other definitions, as well as other aspects and reasons for 
mental distress: they argue that community knowledge and context is an essential part of 
defining and dealing with what we might refer to in a western context as mental illness.  
Summerfield (2008) takes particular issue with the way that this is not taken into account in 
many studies within the movement, arguing that this represents “medical imperialism, similar 
to the marginalisation of indigenous knowledge systems in the colonial era” (p.992). His 
point, and that of other critics of similar views, is that rather than improve the well-being of 
individuals across the world, the global mental health movement risks ignoring local 
knowledge, customs and practices, promoting instead ‘western’ ideas on diagnosis and 
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treatment (which may be more or less valid) (Summerfield, 2008; 2013), and that this may 
end up being detrimental to those involved.   
This argument fits perfectly with a social representational approach, and can be 
applied equally to the mental health literacy movement and ‘western’ ideas on mental health 
problems. It is no coincidence that Moscovici (1998) drew on concepts from anthropology in 
developing his social psychology of common sense: the clear message here is that we can 
apply the approaches we use to study ‘other’ cultures just as confidently in our own cultures, 
and indeed we must if we are to appreciate the genesis and development of multiple forms of 
understanding within (and not merely between) societies.  On this basis, then, we need 
equally to understand the understandings about mental health problems in our own society, 
that is, how and why they develop, the purpose they serve and so on, before assuming that 
they need to be changed.  This does not give carte blanche to those who seek to stigmatise 
people with a mental health problem, nor does it suggest that it is not problematic for 
someone to hold fearful beliefs about mental illness that prevent them from visiting a doctor 
when in distress.  Rather, it means that we need to understand the historical and cultural 
context of those stigmatising or fearful beliefs and the purpose they serve for the person who 
holds them, in full before we can understand how we might go about working to change 
them, and, perhaps even most importantly, to what we might seek to change them.  
Another contribution from studies largely of other societies’ understandings about 
mental health problems that should be of utility to mental health campaigns is the notion of 
cognitive polyphasia.  Again, a cornerstone of the theory of social representations is the 
recognition that contrary to some assumptions within other areas of psychology, such as 
cognitive dissonance theory, one form of knowledge does not necessarily subsume another, 
and ideas that may seem contradictory to an outsider can be maintained by individuals within 
a social group (Batel and Castro, 2009). As Jovchelovitch and Priego-Hernandez (2015) have 
put it, “there is dynamic coexistence between different systems of knowledge,” (p.164). 
Many studies of understandings of mental health problems around the world have argued for 
the existence of this cognitive polyphasia: Wagner, Themel and Duveen (2000) and Arthi 
(2012) studied representations of mental illness in India and Singapore respectively, and both 
found that more ‘western’ ideas based on psychiatry could co-exist with (seemingly 
contradictory) ideas drawn from more ‘traditional’ belief structures.  These might be used in 
different contexts, at different times, or for different purposes, but, significantly, adoption of 
‘western’ psychiatric notions of mental illness did not negate other ideas.  Again, it is 
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possible to see how this process might also operate in what we might consider to be ‘western’ 
cultures.  Classic studies on social representations of mental illness such as those of Jodelet 
(1991) and De Rosa (1987) show how ideas about ‘madness’ that have their roots in medieval 
notions of contagion through the humours, or of magic-fantastic ideas, continue to be 
reflected in current thinking, often through non-conscious practices, despite overt denial of 
their content. One form of understanding does not necessarily subsume or replace another, 
and these polyphasic understandings of mental health problems will continue to influence 
decision making, interaction, communication and so on.  Mental health campaigns may 
succeed in passing on new or alternative information about mental health to the public, but 
this does not mean that other representations will cease to exist, or to be influential: Arthi 
(2012), for example, detailed how members of the Tamil community in Singapore would 
deny the possibility of spirit possession whilst also describing stories in support of it, as well 
as corresponding treatments; Jodelet (1991) found an explicit denial of the notion that mental 
illness was contagious but a continuing (and sometimes non-conscious) desire to prevent any 
contact with the bodily fluids of the patients living with foster families in the community she 
studied.   
Assumptions about how understanding is incorporated into public understanding, or 
the effects that it will have on behaviour, are also unwise. This is not limited to mental health 
campaigns: as Farr and Marková (1995) and Stockdale (1995) have pointed out in relation to 
both disability charity and HIV awareness campaigns, such attempts at influence can have 
unintended consequences. Early HIV awareness campaigns, for example, reinforced fear with 
images of death which both contributed to stigmatisation of a virus that had already been 
anchored to the plague (Gilman, 1988); these emotional (and often image-based) evocations 
of fear and death are likely to promote strategies of avoidance and so are generally regarded 
as unsuccessful (Joffé, 2008).  Other campaigns that played more on images of safer sex as 
fun and life-enhancing have been regarded as more successful in bringing about changes in 
attitudes and behaviour (ibid).   
Within mental health campaigns, there has often been the assumption that adopting a 
more biomedical perspective on mental ill health would go some way towards 
destigmatisation. This is based largely on the conviction that the general public needs to be 
persuaded that mental illness is, in short, like any other illness. Many campaigners of all 
kinds express frustration that the public seems to resist considering depression or 
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schizophrenia in the same way that they would consider diabetes, asthma or heart disease
2
. 
However, for some time now the failure of many mental health campaigns to convince the 
public of this has been noted (Sarbin and Mancuso, 1970). The problem is not limited to the 
fact that these messages do not seem to convince the public (although this would also seem to 
be the case - see Leff [2001] for more on this), but there is also evidence, including a recent 
meta-analysis by Angermeyer, Holzinger, Carta and Schomerus (2011), that suggests that 
greater acceptance of a biological basis to mental ill health is associated not with greater 
acceptance, but with greater desire for social distance.  Although it has sometimes been 
assumed that a biological model might alter attributions of mental health problems in positive 
ways (Corrigan, 2000), it is has also been suggested that such a model can make mental ill 
health seem to be more an integral part of a person which is not likely to change (Phelan, 
2005). Instead of thinking that this is a person with an illness “like any other”, the individual 
is seen as someone who has something wrong with them which is not going to change, 
something which can remain frightening and difficult to understand (Foster, 2001).   
Another unintended consequence is that some campaigns risk replacing one negative 
representation of people with a mental health problem with another: we might address aspects 
of representation founded on danger and unpredictability (Nunnally, 1961), but do we, as 
Henderson et al (2016) have recently suggested, replace these with ideas that people with 
mental health problems are helpless and pitiful victims? This emerging representation was 
found by Räty as early as 1990, and played a dominant role in the way that people with a 
mental health problem were portrayed in newspaper articles around the time of the proposed 
changes to the Mental Health Act in the UK (Foster, 2006).  Such representations may be 
different from those founded on dangerousness and unpredictability but are potentially 
equally stigmatising and problematic: they might sustain the idea that people with a mental 
health problem are not able to work or present their own views, and their understandings 
might still be dismissed as less important than those of more powerful others (ibid).    
 
SOME CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has argued that considering mental health education campaigns from the 
perspective of social representations theory highlights a number of challenges: firstly, the 
                                                          
2
 See, for example, this extract from the Time to Change campaign website featuring celebrity Ruby Wax 
http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/news-media/celebrity-supporters/ruby-wax 
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assumption that understandings should be changed, and what it should be changed to might 
be problematic; secondly, the question over how far understandings can be changed, taking 
into consideration both the historical tenacity and societal context of representations as well 
as aspects of cognitive polyphasia; finally the problem of assuming that we understand the 
ways in which understandings might change and their consequences has been considered. At 
the heart of these criticisms is the suggestion that the social context of knowledge, in terms of 
its development, maintenance and influence, has to be taken seriously by anyone involved in 
mental health campaigns.  
However, this does not imply that attempts to change and develop understandings 
using the theory of social representations should not be made: in fact, as shown by other 
studies (Krause 2003; Jovchelovitch and Priego-Hernandez 2013) using social 
representations theory to understand the way that knowledge develops in different contexts, 
the purpose it serves for different groups and the way that different forms of knowledge 
interact with one another, has real transformative power and potential. However, to date 
many studies using social representations theory that examine health campaigns have used 
social representations theory reactively, that is, to examine campaigns that have already taken 
place (Farr and Marková, 1995; Joffe, 2008; Stockdale, 1995); the most significant exception 
to this is Lauri’s (2015) work on organ donation in Malta, which, as discussed earlier, 
employs the theory of social representations from the outset in designing and delivering a 
campaign focused mainly on targeting particular groups instead of individuals, and which 
enjoyed significant success (ibid).   
In her summary of this programme, Lauri (2015) argues that social representations 
theory “brings about a paradigm shift in communications campaign research,” (p.410).  The 
theory undoubtedly has this potential, but I would also argue that mental health campaigns do 
not, as yet, all reflect this.  Those which have started to engage with these processes, for 
example through targeting different groups with different messages, are likely to have greater 
success in starting to bring about real change (Henderson et al, 2016), but there is more that 
could be done through drawing on social representations theory at all stages of any mental 
health campaign.  
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